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Designing Constitutions
for a Lasting Democracy
BY DONALD L. HOROWITZ AND
ELISABETH PERHAM

T

he rule of law in modern democratic societies generally relies
upon a constitution — a founding document that reflects a society’s
values and offers a framework for protecting and institutionalizing those
values. Since the United States ratified
the first modern-day constitution in
1787, hundreds of countries have codified their own constitutions (Cuba and
Thailand are the most recent, in 2019
and 2017, respectively). Some have succeeded in building strong democracies.
Some have not.
Duke Law Professor Donald L.
Horowitz — the James B. Duke Professor
of Law and Political Science Emeritus
at Duke University and one of the
world’s foremost scholars on constitution-making, particularly in highly
divided societies — has observed
the process of constitutional design
in a variety of settings over the
course of several decades. In his new
book, Constitutional Processes and
Democratic Commitment, he explores
these processes and assesses the
ways in which the design process
itself affects the document’s ultimate
success. Constitutions designed by
consensus, he argues, tend to create

the strongest commitment to democracy and therefore have the best
chance of long-term success.
Elisabeth Perham of Western Sydney
University School of Law recently interviewed Horowitz for the International
Association of Constitutional Law blog.
The following is a lightly edited transcript of their discussion, in which
Horowitz shares his experiences
observing and assisting in the design
of constitutions around the world and
explains why a process focused on
building consensus produces the strongest constitutions. We share it here
with permission from (and thanks to)
the IACL blog.
• Watch the full interview here.
• Read more about the book on the
publisher’s website.
• Hear a roundtable discussion of the
book among global constitutional law
scholars convened by the National
University of Singapore.

ELISABETH PERHAM: Hello, friends
of the International Association of
Constitutional Law (IACL) blog. I’m
Elisabeth Perham, an assistant editor for the blog, and I’m delighted to

be joined today by Donald Horowitz,
who among other things is the James
B. Duke Professor of Law and Political
Science Emeritus at Duke University,
is an author of eight books, has held
positions as a fellow or visiting professor, research fellow or fellow at
institutions in Australia, Germany,
Hungary, New Zealand, Malaysia,
Singapore, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, and has advised
a number of countries about ethnic power sharing and constitutional
design, particularly for divided
societies.
Welcome Professor, and congratulations on the publication of your
new book, Constitutional Processes
and Democratic Commitment. It’s
a pleasure to read, and I found it
hugely enlightening. As indicated by
the title, it discusses how constitutional processes can best be designed
to maximize the chances of securing
an enduring commitment to democracy. To start, would you mind telling
us a little bit about why you decided to
write this book?

DONALD HOROWITZ: I’d be happy
to. I have, over the course of many
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years, seen a lot of constitutional processes upfront — beginning in a sort of
accidental way in Nigeria during one
of their several constitutional processes some decades ago. I happened
to be in Nigeria and became a consultant to one of the delegations to the
constituent assembly, which asked me
to evaluate a proposal made by another
delegation for an electoral system to
choose a president. They were moving
at the time from a parliamentary system to a presidential system and they
wanted to choose a president in a way
that would not be conducive to ethnic
bias in the incumbent who was chosen. They actually had devised a unique
way of doing it, of which I thoroughly
approved. And what we did was to go
over a lot of data in the course of a relatively short time to figure out how it
might come out. And so I advised them
to do it, and they did. A version of it
has been adopted now in Indonesia and
also in Kenya.
I also closely observed the Iraqi
process in the early 2000s because I
was a member of a U.S. government
committee that was following Iraqi
developments. And I was asked by
people in Afghanistan to produce a
memorandum in response to some
memoranda that they had gotten from
American academic lawyers, urging
the Afghans to adopt an American
system of judicial review for constitutionality. Circumstances there were
very different from those prevailing in
the United States, and I was happy to
produce a more balanced memorandum than the one they had. And finally,
just pulling out examples out of the
hat, I was involved in the early stages
of the Fiji constitutional process that
eventuated in a new constitution of Fiji
in 1997.
So I have seen a lot of constitutional
processes, and how they fail and how

Jury studies
show that better
arguments
are made, that
minorities get their
views attended to
more closely and
that people listen to
each other better
when the standard is
unanimous decision
making.
they might succeed, and that’s what
compelled me to write this book.

PERHAM: What did you hope to see
as the book’s main contributions? And
who do you see as the main audiences
for this book?

HOROWITZ: Well, the book makes
an argument for consensus decision
making. If you go back and think about
constitutional processes, or in fact
almost any decision processes, there
are several different standards by
which one can make decisions. One can
do it by majority vote. One can make a
decision by negotiations in which reciprocity is the prevailing underlying
method. Or one can look for a consensus — that is, you and I can look for a
way of living together in politics that
suits us both. Not because you want
one thing and I want another thing,
as in a negotiation; or we want the
same things but different quantities of
them, which is another kind of negotiation; and not because my people have
outvoted your people; but because

we’ve agreed to seek consensus as the
method of proceeding with political
life together.
I’ve always thought consensus was
likely to do a better job than negotiation or voting. And we know, for
example, from studies of deliberative
democracy, that consensus as the standard induces people to make better
arguments and to make more public-regarding arguments — that is to
say, not arguments about what’s good
for them, but what’s good for the collectivity. We also know the same thing
from jury deliberations where the jury
must be unanimous, as for the most
part they must be in criminal cases in
the United States. Jury studies show
that better arguments are made, that
minorities get their views attended to
more closely and that people listen to
each other better when the standard
is unanimous decision making. Now, if
you read the book carefully, my notion
of consensus isn’t exactly the same as
unanimity, but it’s pretty close to unanimity, and it ought to elicit the same
kinds of good arguments. Of course,
you can’t resolve everything by consensus, even in the best processes. So
once in a while, you’re going to have to
compromise. Once in a while, you may
even be relegated to voting. But that’s
what the main contribution is.
As to the audience, this is a book I
think that’s not too filled with technical
material, and so it ought to be able to
be read by anybody who’s had a decent
education, and specifically it ought to
be read or can be read by students, by
faculty members, and I’m hoping that
it will be read by people who make
constitutions and people who advise
people who make constitutions.

PERHAM: As you’ve mentioned,
you’ve spent your career working on
these kinds of questions around con-

3

JUDICATURE INTERNATIONAL
stitution making for severely divided
societies around the world. And
you’ve focused both on process, as in
this book, and on design questions.
In the preface you say that you initially saw the questions of process and
design as one single subject, but then
you decided that they were, in fact,
best treated separately, and this book
focuses on process. Could you speak a
little bit more about why you decided
that process and design needed to be
treated separately?

HOROWITZ: Well, I think the process
ought to be able to travel well, regardless of what the design is going to be.
Undoubtedly, the process will affect
the design, but the truth is that there
are many disputes about what the
right design is, especially for severely
divided societies, but also for all societies. Are we going to go parliamentary
or presidential, for example? Are we
going to go federal or unitary? These
are some standard questions that
sometimes plague decision makers in
the course of constitutional processes,
because they just don’t agree. But if
they agree on a process, I think they’ll
do a lot better in sorting out those
disputes.
With severely divided societies,
there’s a very big dispute in the literature between those who advocate a
consociational regime. That’s a regime
in which all groups are included — not
just in the parliament or the legislature, but also in the executive branch
of the government — and in which
groups are said to have a veto, a suspensive veto or maybe a final veto, over
policy. I find I’m not a very keen fan of
that mode of constitutional design,
because I think it’s conducive to a lot of
stalemate because of the veto feature.
And the alternative to that is the
centripetal model, which features

interethnic coalitions of ethnically
based parties, which are very common in severely divided societies,
and those interethnic coalitions then
get together to pool their votes. The
only way they can do that is to behave
moderately on issues of concern to all
groups, and the result is an interethnic
coalition that produces some satisfactions for pretty much everybody. I
think that’s better. If you superimpose
disputes about how to proceed — where
I want a consociational regime and
you want a centripetal one, and somebody else wants neither, or a straight
majoritarian regime — you really won’t
get anywhere. So I wanted to lay out a
process that could travel, regardless
of whatever the substantive disputes
happen to be about or what the right
dispensation is for a particular country.
By the way, I should also say that this
is an argument, it’s not a proof. This
question isn’t definitively settled by
my book. I just wanted to push the ball
down the road as great a distance as I
could.

PERHAM: I thought one of the most
powerful things in the book was the
combination, in building the argument, of the theoretical insights
— which you’ve drawn from, among
other places, political theory and
constitutional law — and empirical
insights from political science presented in combination with many
case studies from constitution-making processes around the world. I also
appreciated the chapter-long case
study, of the recent Sri Lankan process.
I found the case studies very helpful,
both in illustrating the points to assist
in understanding what you were saying and as evidence towards your
argument. I’m working on my PhD
at the moment, so I know case study
selection and methodology is always a

vexed question in comparative work,
and I wondered if you could speak a
bit more about how you thought about
these issues when writing the book?

HOROWITZ: Yes, the book takes off
from a remark in another book by Tom
Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James
Melton, The Endurance of National
Constitutions (Cambridge University
Press, 2009). And they say, look, with
respect to process, we know one thing
about it: that if all social groups are
included, meaning all ethnic groups
as well, or religious groups for that
matter, then that’s more conducive to
a durable process. And other people
have shown that inclusion indeed is
conducive to a more democratic outcome. So the question then is: What
else makes for a good process, for a
durable constitutional or democratic
constitutional outcome?
And it seems to me, that’s a question
very well worth pursuing, because process choices are terrifically important.
And they say, well, we can’t deal with
this question because, by one account,
there are 18 different processes. And
we can’t process the processes by
using quantitative methods that are
familiar to us. So there’s going to have
to be a lot of digging in case studies. I
said, “Well, I’ve been involved in a lot
of case studies, and those I haven’t
been involved in, I think I know which
ones have been written up well enough
so that one can extract material from
them.” But what do you want? Well, we
want material on those: If the hypothesis is that consensus should help, let’s
get some where there was consensus,
and let’s get others where there wasn’t
consensus.
By the way, my idea about consensus and constitution making
originally comes from Indonesia,
because I observed the Indonesian
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process very, very closely and wrote
a book called Constitutional Processes
and Democracy in Indonesia, published by Cambridge Press in 2013. The
Indonesians practically took no votes.
They took one vote, but not on anything
having to do with the constitution as
such. They waited until they got a consensus. And so if that’s the beginning
of the hypothesis, then along comes
the Tunisian constitution of 2015,
which the best write-ups say was a
product of consensus supplemented by
negotiation — maybe requiring one or
two votes along the way — but with an
overwhelmingly favorable vote at the
end, which, it seems to me, supported
the idea that this was a consensual
document, and a consensual document
involving two polarized sides: One
of them was decidedly, and aggressively, and militantly secular, and the
other side started out representing an
Islamist party, which in the end, came
to be really not an Islamist party, but
an Islamic party with a democratic
agenda. The two sides fought quite a
lot, but in the end they mostly reached
consensus. They did have a negotiation
or two. In fact, one, has an ironic connection to the thesis of this book. But
for the most part, they reached consensus on what they were doing.
It’s not a perfect constitution. And, as
you know, there’s been a coup in Tunisia
subsequently, and so you might say,
“Oh, it discredits the thesis.” But actually it doesn’t, because the coup was
made by somebody who was not committed because he wasn’t a member of
the constitutional drafting committee. He was actually, for a time, in the
expert committee that advised it, but
he wasn’t really involved in the constitutional process in a deep way. He
eventually became president. He came
out of nowhere to be elected president. And the Islamists didn’t want

a presidential system, they wanted a
parliamentary system.
In any event, so along comes Tunisia,
and then I said, “Gee, the Indian constitution, if I recall correctly, was made by
consensus,” and indeed when I went
back and looked closely at the process
for the Indian constitution, it was made
by consensus. Again, a few votes, and a
lot of positions changed along the way.
People argued. Consensus involves
argumentation and reasoning in a process of deliberation, which can change
people’s minds. And quite a lot of that
happened in India.
So I’ve got those cases — Indonesia,
Tunisia, India — on one side, and
then I wanted to contrast negotiated outcomes and m a j o r i t a r i a n
outcomes, because n e g o t i a t i o n
and voting are alternative ways to
make constitutions. So there we have
the deals in Iraq and Kenya and Fiji,
and the majoritarian constitution of
Nepal that was made contrary to the
earlier consensus-seeking process.
So I have those four cases, which are
pretty extensively examined in the
book in contrast with the three consensual cases. And it turns out that the
three consensual cases are not perfect
democracies, but they have much better democracy scores by any objective
measures than the four that were not
made by consensus.
Now that’s not to rule out an endogeneity; it is possible that predispositions
govern the choice of process. That’s
okay, as long as we know that one process is more likely to produce a result
than another. Be that as it may, that
was the way I selected the cases: by
which ones were well enough written
up so that one could really figure out
what the essence of the decision process was, and particularly those that
I knew something about more intimately, as against others about which

we also knew a lot but were made by a
different process.

PERHAM: You’ve sort of spoken a little bit about the influences of working
in certain countries and the Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Melton book, and, of
course, you yourself are one of the
leading scholars in the world of questions of constitution making and
severely divided societies. I also wondered who else’s work was influential
on you throughout the course of the
project?

HOROWITZ: I can name a few people,
actually. Jon Elster, who is a Norwegian
scholar who teaches these days at
Columbia University in New York, but
previously taught at the University
of Chicago and then the Collège de
France. He is, I think, the gold standard on deliberation and constitutional
processes. I don’t agree with him on
everything, but he hasn’t regarded
me as an enemy yet, which is a little unusual in academic life! He says,
“You should avoid bad processes. We
know what’s bad. We don’t really know
what’s good. Just avoid what’s bad, and
that’s the best we can do. And for the
rest, leave the decision makers alone.”
I think we can actually do a little bit
better than that. I agree with him that
we don’t know everything, but we do
know a few things.
He also says that we shouldn’t allow
legislators to make constitutions,
because they will advantage themselves in their later lives. If they’re
going to go back to being legislators,
they will write a good constitution for
the advantage of legislators. The evidence doesn’t suggest that is generally
true. I can think of one or two cases
where it has been true, but mostly, it’s
not true — especially, by the way, if you
get them onto the consensual path,

5

JUDICATURE INTERNATIONAL
because then they’re thinking about
living life together in politics. That’s
the way I like to think of it anyway. But
I do think that his treatments of the
deliberation in the American constitutional framing in the 1787 constitution
and in the Estates General at the time
of the French revolution are quite
wonderful treatments.
A more practical person, but also an
academic, is Christina Murray, who
is emerita professor at University of
Cape Town, now with the UN, and is
one of the most experienced constitution makers in world. She was involved
in South Africa and in Kenya and in a
dozen others. Not only does she have
good ideas, both in print and out of
print, but she also corrects a lot of my
errors. A lot of people who write think
that they don’t have errors in what
they write. I’m willing to presume that
I do have them, but I can’t find them.
And if you have someone who can find
them for you, that’s really helpful, and
she’s excellent at that.
I’ve also found, by the way, your mentor, Rosalind Dixon, is very persuasive,
especially on drafting questions. And
I’ve been involved in one or two sessions with Ros when she had really
perceptive things to say about how
we should draft this. She figures in the
book about drafting long and drafting
short, and her observations on that
I think are quite cogent. So those are
some of the people who are most influential, I would say.

PERHAM: I’m coming from an early
career point of view, but I think this
next question is interesting to, well,
all of us who write. What were some
of the main challenges that you faced
in writing the book?

HOROWITZ: I can think of two
kinds. One is at a certain level, triv-

If you have an
interim constitution
that is not the one
you want, but it’s
serviceable at least
for making the new
constitution, use
that and stick with
that for a while,
until the time is ripe
for making a new
constitution.
ial, but very annoying. There’s always
something missing in the middle of
something that you’ve written. So you
write a chapter thinking that you’re
going from A to Z, and you’re going A,
B, C, D, E, F, G, and lo and behold, you’
go back, and it turns out that L, M, N,
O, and P are missing, just because your
mind skipped over those things. And
going back to fill in missing pieces, I
think is much harder than doing it the
first time. And you do need to go back
and fix it up.
But another challenge with this
book, as I say, is it has an overriding
argument about consensus. But there
were a few other things I wanted to say
— I wanted to deal with ripeness, for
example. Yemen and Somalia shouldn’t
have tried to make constitutions
because things were too disorderly
there. And in fact, the constitutional
effort in Yemen only inflamed the
Houthi rebellion and also the secessionists in the South, the Hiraaks in the
South. So I wanted to say something

about ripeness and how to handle
ripeness. If it’s not ripe, I think I have
a pretty good solution for that: If you
have an interim constitution that is not
the one you want, but it’s serviceable at
least for making the new constitution,
use that and stick with that for a while,
until the time is ripe for making a new
constitution.
Another topic that I wanted to deal
with is faithless interpretation. There’s
some really great cases of faithless
interpretation in Malaysia, though
they are now coming out of that and
producing much better interpretations by a process that’s fascinating
to watch. But reneging — why does
the next generation renege? Well, it
reneges more often, actually, with
respect to bargains that it sees in retrospect as having been unfair than it
does on consensus. That’s at least my
working hypothesis.
Or timing. Timing in Sri Lanka was
always out of joint. They started out
right after a good election that was
favorable to the new process, but they
wasted a lot of time, including in public
participation, which is another question that I also wanted to integrate into
the book. I’ve always had strong views
about that and how public participation was oversold — it’s not useless, but
it was certainly oversold in constitutional process studies. They did waste a
lot of time on public participation that
only taught them something that they
already knew, namely, that the public
was divided on the question.
Furthermore, they had an internal
problem with their experts that I didn’t
emphasize very much in the chapter
on Sri Lanka. Their experts disagreed
with a lot of the procedures that were
being used — not so much with the substance, but the procedures that were
being used — and they didn’t control
the experts very well, and make very
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good use of them. That slowed them
down. By the time they were done,
they had a different timing problem —
namely, they were running up against
an election, in which a president who
had been unpopular in 2015 suddenly
became popular again, and he was
about to return to office. He became
prime minister. He couldn’t come back
as president. His brother, however,
became the president, so you get the
idea that it’s a family business. So then
their consensus fell apart at that point,
and they had to abandon the project.
Those weren’t the only problems.
The major problem was that neither
the president nor the prime minister
at the time, who were from different
parties, but had lined up for the 2015
elections, was really committed to the
venture. They were both afraid of it,
in a certain way. They were afraid of
losing some of their clientele to what
might become an unpopular venture.
So they defected in advance, in a certain way.
So there were many problems. And
I wanted to integrate all of these into
the book, and I had to do a separate
chapter on Sri Lanka. There was no
way to do this short of a full engagement with Sri Lanka. The interviews
were conducted either by telephone
or by zoom, because by then, we were
into the pandemic and there was no
chance to just drop in to Sri Lanka for
this purpose, quite the opposite.
So those were some of the things I
wanted to include.

PERHAM: What’s next for you in
terms of academic projects?
HOROWITZ: Three things, actually.
I’m the co-editor of an edited volume on Malaysia’s electoral reform
proposals that were put out by a com-

Most countries
haven’t figured
out how to
cope with
discrimination.
They haven’t
figured out,
effectively, how
to produce legal
remedies for
discrimination.
mission that was assigned to do the
work during the previous regime that
came to power in 2018 but fell in 2020.
They produced a quite complete report
dealing with many aspects of electoral reform, which are long overdue
in Malaysia, ranging from whether to
deal with malapportionment, electoral
system reform, real change in the electoral system they proposed, changes
in the way the electoral commission
operates, changes in the way in which
legal challenges to election results
proceed, and so on. So this is a kind
of soup-to-nuts set of proposals, and
the book tracks all of those and some
others. For example, the role of civil
society in producing reform proposals,
which then get picked up by the commission, dealing with electoral reform.
The second project I’m nearly finished with: A book on federalism,
regional autonomy, and ethnic conflict,
because federalism and regional autonomy are frequently recommended to
deal with ethnic conflict, sometimes
with some considerable success. There

are two big surprises in this book:
There’s an argument that if you produce a federal regime in an ethnically
divided country and there are certain
units that are populated by particular
groups that are minority in the country as a whole, but a majority in those
units — as, for example, in Scotland, or
in Catalonia, or in many other countries — you will foster a secession. But
successful secessions don’t seem to
eventuate from such federations. If
you reason about it very carefully, and
you look at the cases very closely, this
is a big surprise.
The less controversial but maybe
more surprising finding is that devolution to units that are inhabited by
majorities, whether they are majorities
in the country as a whole or majorities
merely in those units, works out very,
very poorly for minorities in those
units. That is, there’s a tremendous
amount of violence, oppression, lack of
freedom, discrimination against those
minorities in many, many countries
that have had this kind of devolution.
And it’s serious. Why is it allowed to
fester? Because it’s a rule of law problem, because most countries haven’t
figured out how to cope with discrimination. They haven’t figured out,
effectively, how to produce legal remedies for discrimination and how, for
that matter, to produce police who
don’t discriminate when there’s violence. This problem is pervasive. I’m
still documenting it. And I will come
to some suggestions, not for how to
adopt a rule of law where there isn’t
one but how to shore up the rule of law
where there are rudiments of the rule
of law but they’re not being effectively
utilized.
In the meantime, I’ve got another
book that I’ve been working on for
years, a big comparative book on
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power sharing in ethnically divided
countries and why it’s so hard to do.
Power sharing is a big adoption problem, because majorities want majority
rule, and minorities want freedom
from majority rule. I wrote a brief
piece in the Journal of Democracy in
2014 on this very question, but this
book is going to be a long book. That’s
one reason why I decided that I had to
write the process book separately and
definitely not incorporate that in it.
I’ll tell you something funny: My
book Ethnic Groups in Conflict is an
exceedingly well-cited book, but

mostly I think by people who haven’t read it, because they say, “I’m
looking for a citation where it says
such-and-such is the case in an ethnically divided country.” And they say,
“Well, Horowitz has 684 pages, it must
be in there, so I’ll cite that.” So yes, frequently cited books have two different
sides. One, they’re influential on the
merits and therefore they’re cited.
Or two, they’re presumed to be compendious, and therefore they’re cited.
And I’ve always been afraid that Ethnic
Groups in Conflict is cited because it’s
presumed to be compendious!

PERHAM: Thank you so much,
Professor Horowitz, for your time,
and to our listeners and viewers on
the IACL blog for joining us, today or
into the future.
HOROWITZ: My pleasure. Thank you.
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